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Many suppose that democracy is an ethos which includes, inter alia, a degree of
economic equality among citizens.  In contrast, we conceive of democracy as ruthless
political competition between groups of citizens, organized into parties.  We inquire
whether such competition, which we assume to be concerned with distributive matters,
will engender economic equality in the long run.
The society consists of an infinite sequence of generations, each comprised of
adults and their children.  Adults care about household consumption, and the future
wages of their children, which are determined by educational policy.  A given generation
is characterized by the distribution of wages earned by its adults.  Parties form  and
propose policies to redistribute income among households, and to invest in the education
of children; the educational policy that is victorious determines the distribution of wages
in the next generation of adults.
A political equilibrium concept is proposed which determines two parties
endogenously, and their proposed policies in political competition.   One party wins the
election (stochastically).  This process determines a sequence of wage distributions across
the generations, and we ask: Under what conditions does the wage distribution tend to
one of equality?
We show that, under a technological assumption that appears to hold empirically,
there is no assurance that wage equality is eventually achieved, but if  certain ‘social
norms’ hold, which restrict the space of acceptable political policies, then equality is
eventually achieved.  We suggest, moreover, that the social norms in question will tend to
hold, the more technologically developed the democracy is.
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§1   Introduction
Among types of political system, the one most identified in contemporary
western society with the production of justice is democracy.  Even on the political left,
democracy has largely replaced socialism as the regime desideratum.  Just as those
socialists who were dissatisfied with aspects of Soviet society claimed that the Soviet
regime was not real socialism, so those who continue to be dissatisfied with, for example,
the American system, now argue that it is not an instance of real democracy.  Real
democracy is thought to be a political system in which genuine representation of all
citizens – and even justice – is achieved.
The identification of democracy with justice is not simply a practice of many
political theorists: perhaps the most important aspect of political transformation in the
world in the last fifty years has been the toppling of authoritarian regimes, and their
replacement with democratic ones.  Just as socialism was a powerful movement in the
first half of the twentieth century – by 1950, fully one-third of the world’s peoples lived
under regimes that described themselves as socialist – so democracy has been the
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massively appealing political doctrine in, let us say, the period since 1960. And as it was
an error of socialists to identify socialism with All Good Things, so now it is an error of
democrats to identify democracy with All Good Things
1.  The most common example of
this fallacy is when some say that regime X cannot be a democracy, because it sustains
Bad Thing Y (oppression of women, abrogation of civil rights, etc.). If democracy is
defined as a set of political institutions, rather than as an ethos, then the correct approach
is to study what those institutions entail.  Perhaps, for example, both the oppression of
women and its absence can co-exist with democracy.
In this article, we undertake a study of this kind:  we ask whether democracy,
understood as a system of political competition between parties that represent different
coalitions of citizens,  will engender justice, or – as we here interpret justice, equality.  Of
course, we cannot answer that broad question generally, and so we narrow it down to
something manageable.  In particular we focus upon the role of public education as an
instrument for reducing the differentials in human capital that would otherwise obtain,
and we ask whether democracy  will entail the equalization of human capital through
political decisions concerning educational investment.
We model the following society, one which reproduces itself over many
generations.  At the initial date, there are households led by adults characterized by a
distribution of human capital, that is, capacities to produce income.  Each adult has one
child.  The human capital the child will have, when next period, she has become an adult,
                                                                                                                                                3
is a monotone increasing function of her parent’s level of human capital and the amount
that was invested in her education.  This relationship is (until section 6) deterministic, and
describes the educational production function for all children. Thus, it requires more
investment to bring a child from a poor (low human capital ) family up to a given level of
human capital than a child from a richer family.  All parents have the same utility
function:  a parent cares about her household’s consumption (that is, her after-tax
income), and the earning power her child will have, as an adult.  We will, for simplicity,
assume that adults do not value leisure.
Educational finance is, until section 5, purely public.  The polity of adults, at each
date, must make four political decisions: how much to tax themselves, how to split the tax
revenues between a redistributive component for households’ consumption and the
educational budget, how to partition the budget for redistribution among adults, and how
to partition the educational budget as investment in particular children, according to their
type (that is, their parental human capital).  Once these political decisions are
implemented, a distribution of human capital is determined for the next generation.  When
the present children become adults, characterized by that distribution of human capital,
they face the same four political decisions.  We wish to study the asymptotic distribution
of human capital of this dynamic process.
In the society we have described, a child is characterized by the family
(household) into which he is born, for his capacity to transform educational investment
                                                                                                                                                
1 There are many people who identify democracy with justice.  For instance, Adolfo Perez Esquivel, a
Nobel Peace Prize laureate, recently said, “The vote does not define democracy.  Democracy means justice
and equality.” (The Daily Journal [Caracas], July 12, 2001)4
into future earning power is determined by his family background, proxied by his parent’s
human capital.  We imagine that the transmission of ‘culture’ to the child is indicated by
the parent’s human capital endowment.  We view the child’s capacity successfully to
absorb educational investment, and transform it into human capital, as a circumstance
beyond his control, and so a society of this kind that wished rapidly to equalize
opportunities for all children would compensate children from poorer families with more
educational investment.  Equality of opportunity would be achieved when all adults have
the same human capital, for that means, as children in the previous generation, the
compensation for disadvantageous circumstances was complete.  (See Roemer (1998) for
the theory of equality of opportunity, based upon social compensation for
disadvantageous circumstances.)  In the real world, equality of opportunity does not
require equalizing outcomes in this way, because people may remain responsible for some
aspect of their condition, even after the necessary compensation for disadvantage has
been made.  But in our model there is no such element, and so, if we take equality of
opportunity as our conception of justice, then justice will have been achieved exactly
when the wage-earning capacities of all adults are equal.
One might object that it is sufficient to equalize (post-tax) incomes for justice.
But it may well be the case that individuals derive welfare not only from consumption,
but from their human capital, and so we insist that this more demanding condition of
human-capital equality is the one of interest.   Indeed, if one’s human capital is an enabler
of self-realization, then it is surely the case that justice would require a concern with
levels of human capital in a society, not simply income levels.5
We will stipulate a democratic process for solving society’s political problems, at
each generation.  Our question becomes:  How close will the asymptotic distribution of
human capital engendered by this political process be to an equal distribution?
The focus of our model will be on that democratic process.  We employ a concept
of democratic political equilibrium that takes as data the distribution of preferences of the
polity over a given policy space, and produces as its output an endogenous partition of
the polity into two political parties, a policy proposal by each party, and a probability
that each party will win the election.  We suppose that an election occurs, and the policy
of the victorious party is implemented.  Our procedure will be to begin with a distribution
of adult human capital at date 0, which will determine the distribution of adult preferences
at date 0.  The dynamic process is thus initialized.
Although we have described the political choice as consisting of four independent
decisions, we will in fact model the political problem as one on an infinite dimensional
policy space.  That policy space, denoted T, will consist of pairs of functions (, ) ψ r
where ψ() h  is the after-tax household income of an adult with human capital h, and rh ()
is the public educational investment in a child from an h -family.  The only restrictions
on these functions are that they be continuous, jointly satisfy a budget constraint, and
satisfy two constraints that we call social norms.  Thus, the present analysis marks a
substantial technical advance over analyses in political economy that must limit their
scope to unidimensional policy spaces, or policy spaces of small dimension.  But the
advance is not merely technical.  It is surely artificial to restrict a democratic polity’s
choice of policies to ones with simple mathematical properties, such as linearity.  Our6
ability to solve the political problem with no such restrictions means that we are able to
model the democratic struggle as ruthlessly competitive: no holds, in the sense of
unmotivated restrictions on the nature of policy proposals, are barred, except
(importantly), those precluded by the social norms.
That political equilibrium concept is ‘party unanimity Nash equilibrium with
endogenous parties.’  In two recent articles, I introduced the concept of ‘party unanimity
Nash equilibrium (PUNE), (Roemer [1999, 1998]).  The extension to ‘PUNE with
endogenous parties’ is introduced in Roemer (2001, Chapter 13).  The endogenous-party
aspect is grafted from a model of Baron (1993).
It is probably fair to say that most articles in political economy propose a
relatively sophisticated model of the economy, and a trivial model of politics (standardly,
political equilibrium consists in both parties’ proposing the median voter’s ideal point, or,
more generally, a Condorcet winner in the policy space).  Our approach here is just the
opposite: the economy is very simple, but the politics are quite complex.  Our first
justification for the complex politics is that it enables us to solve the problem of political
equilibrium with multi- and even infinite dimensional policy spaces, when Condorcet
winners do not exist.   Our second justification, for the problem at hand, is that our focus
is upon the workings of democracy, and therefore, a careful articulation of democratic
institutions is appropriate.  Of course, a more highly articulated model of the economy
would also be desirable, if tractability were not sacrificed.
In section 2, the definition of political equilibrium that we will use, and a
companion concept of quasi-equilbrium,  are presented.  In section 3, we characterize the7
policies in the political equilibria of the model.  Section 4 does the dynamics.  Section 5
relaxes the assumption that all educational investment is public.  Section 6 introduces a
stochastic element in the determination of the human capital of the next generation, and
section 7 concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of our results for
democratic theory.
§2 Party unanimity Nash equilibrium with endogenous parties (PUNEEP)
In this section, I define PUNEEP and a related concept.
Let H be a set of voter types, where hH ∈ is distributed according a to
probability measure F in the society in question.  Let T be a set of policies.  There is a
function vT H : ×→ R which represents the preferences of types over policies; thus
vh (, ) ⋅  is the utility function of type h on T.  For each h, we assume that vh (, ) ⋅  is a von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function for lotteries on T.
Let tt T
12 , ∈  be two policies; we define π(, ) tt
12, the probability that policyt
1
defeats policy t
2.  Our datum is a function π
*:[ , ] [ , ] 01 01 → , such that ππ
** () , () , 0011 ==
and π
* is strictly increasing on [0,1].
Let Ω(, ) tt
12 be the set of types who prefer tt I t t
12 1 2  to    and   ( , )be the set of types
who are indifferent between tt
12  and  .  Then we define, pro tem
2:
ππ ( , ) ( ( ( , )) ( ( , ))).
* tt tt Itt
12 12 12 1
2
=+ FF Ω (2.1)
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In other words, FF ((,) ) ( (,) ) Ω tt Itt
12 12 1
2
+  is the mass of voters who  in principle
will vote for t
1 — but perhaps some voters will make mistakes or perhaps F is measured
imperfectly.  Equation (2.1) says that the probability that t
1 defeats t
2 is an increasing
function of the ‘expected’ vote for t
1.
A party structure is a partition of H into two elements.  We specialize, now, to
the case H = + R , and further specialize by requiring that both elements in a party
structure be intervals:  thus a party structure is characterized by a pivotal type
hL h R h
** * ,[ , ) [ , ) .  with   and  = =∞ 0  We call the two parties Left   and Right  () () LR .
Associated with a party is a utility function, which is the average of its members
utility functions.
Thus
vt v t h dh
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(We drop a multiplicative constant.)  The utility functions ν(, ) ⋅ h are assumed to be
cardinally measurable and unit comparable (CUC), so that averaging them makes sense.
All parties contain three factions: opportunists, reformists, and militants.  (These
factions are not to be identified with particular citizen types.)  Each faction possesses a
real-valued payoff function defined on TT × .  The payoff functions of the three factions

































with an analogous definition for Right’s three factions.  The three factions are interested,
respectively, in winning (opportunists), party-member welfare (reformists), and publicity
(militants).  For elaboration, the reader is referred to Roemer (1999, 2001).
Definition 1.  A party unanimity Nash equilibrium with endogenous parties (PUNEEP) is
a party structure (,) LRgiven by Lh = [, )
* 0  and Rh =∞ > [
*, ) with h
* 0, and a pair of
policies tt T
LR , ∈  such that
(A) there is no policy tT ∈ such that
LJ R LJL R tt t t J ORM ΠΠ (, ) , , , , ≥ () =  for 
with at least one of these inequalities strict;
(B) there is no policy tT ∈  such that
RJL RJL R tt tt J O R M ΠΠ (, ) (,) , ,, ≥=  for 
with at least one of these inequalities strict;
(C)      
hL v t h v th






(, ) (, )
.
The three payoff functions of a parties’ factions each represent a complete order
on TT × .  We may view their intersection as representing a quasi−order on TT × .  Then
a PUNEEP is a Nash equilibrium of the game played by these two quasi−orders, with the10
additional requirement (C).  Requirement (C) was initially proposed by Baron (1993) as
modeling the stability of a party structure.
Remark 1.  It is easily shown that the reformists are gratuitous in definition 1.  That is, if
we eliminate the reformist factions, we do not alter the set of equilibria.  But notice, once
this is done, we never need mention expected utility, since only the reformists calculate
that.  It thus suffices that {( ,) } vh h H ⋅∈  be a profile of CUC utility functions (i.e., they
need not represent preferences over lotteries).
Remark 2.  It is now convenient to alter the convention on how indifferent voters vote, in
the presence of parties.  When parties are present, we will say that a voter who is
indifferent between policies votes for the policy of his party.  Thus, formally, we now
revise the definition of π to:
ππ ( , ) ( ( ( )) ( ( , )))
* tt t t L I tt
LR L R LR =+ ∩ FF Ω .                   (2.1’)
Remark 3.  In Roemer (2001, Chapter 8), it is shown that if sufficient convexity is
present, then every PUNEEP can be viewed as the outcome of generalized Nash
bargaining between the militant and opportunist factions of each party, given the other
party’s proposal.  There is, in general, a two dimensional manifold of PUNEEP.  Each
one is characterized by specifying the relative bargaining strengths of the two active
factions in each party − thus, two positive numbers.  Thus, parties compete with each
other à la Nash equilibrium, while internal factions bargain with each other à la Nash
bargaining.  The PUNEEP concept thus owes its origins doubly to John Nash.11
We now further specialize to the case that F has a continuous, strictly increasing
distribution function, F,.  on R+
We next define an auxiliary notion that is useful in the analysis.
Definition 2. A quasi-PUNE is an ordered pair (* ,) hy H ∈× R and a pair of policies
tt T
LR , ∈ , such that vt h y vt h
LR (, ) (, * )
* ==  and:
2A. t
L solves








hh t h t h
R ∈⇒ ≥ [, ) (,) ( ,)
* 0 νν (L0)












hh v t hv t h
L ∈∞ ⇒ ≥ [,) ( , ) (, )
* (R0)
vth y (, )
* ≥ (R1)
2C. Constraints (L1) and (R1) bind at tt
LR  and   respectively.
We have:
Proposition 1.  Let v be continuous in h.  If (,, )
* tth
LR is a PUNEEP, then (,,,)
* tthy
LR  is
a quasi-PUNE, with  yv t h





LR  be a PUNEEP with h*>0, Lh R h == ∞ [ , *), [ *, ). 0 and By Remark 2,
ππ (,) (() )
* tt L
LR= F  and 01 << π
*(() ) F L  by definition of π
* and the fact that F is
strictly increasing on R+.  By Condition 1A of PUNEEP, there is no policy t that gives
Left’s militants a higher payoff than they receive at t
L and  gives a higher probability of
victory against t
R.  In particular, there is no policy t that gives Left’s militants a higher
payoff than at  t
L and such that
hhv t h v t h
R ∈⇒≥ [, ) (,) ( ,)
* 0,
and
vth y (, )
* > ,
for if there were, than, by continuity of v in h there would be an interval [, )
** hh+ε  such
that
hh h v t hv t h
R ∈+ ⇒> [, ) ( , ) (, ) .
**ε
It would then follow that at least the set of voters Lh h ∪+ [, )
**ε  would favor t
and so a higher probability of victory could be achieved for Left at no cost to her
militants.
It therefore follows that statement 2A of definition 2 is true, and that () L1 binds.
In like manner, statement 2B of definition 2 is true and () R1  binds, which
concludes the proof.
The converse of Proposition 1 is not true: there may be quasi−PUNEs that are not
PUNEEPs.  For if (,,,)
* tthy
LR  is a quasi-PUNE, it is possible that there exists a policy t13
which improves the payoff of both Left’s militants and opportunists, by assembling a set
of voters who favor t over t
Rthat is disconnected and does not contain h
*.
We can now give a preview of our strategy.  In our politico-economic
environment, we can fully characterize the set of quasi-PUNEs:  the nice fact is that no
recourse to fixed point theorems is required, only to optimization methods.  We will
further note that the set of PUNEEPs is a non−empty subset of the set of quasi-PUNEs.
We then conduct our dynamic analysis assuming that each generation’s political
equilibrium is some quasi-PUNE.  Whatever we conclude will hold a fortiori for societies
whose political equilibria are genuine ones, that is, PUNEEPs.  In this manner we avoid
ever having to solve the very difficult problem of characterizing precisely the set of
PUNEEPs.
§3 The manifold of quasi          −          PUNEEPs
Throughout this section, we analyze the society at one date.
1.  The politico−economic environment
(i)  Preferences
A typical society, in our problem, consists of a continuum of adult types, each
characterized by his/her human capital h, where h is distributed according to a
probability measure F, whose mean is denoted µ.  Each adult has one child.  Adults care
about their own consumption, and their child’s (future) human capital.
We assume:14
uxh x C h ( , ) log( ) log , ′ =− +′ 0 γ (3.1)
where  x is the household’sconsumption, or after-tax income, and  ′ h  is the child’s
(future) human capital. C0 is to interpreted as the level of household income below which
the parent would rather send the child to work than to school.  We think of zero
consumption as minimal household consumption.  If the household’s income is less than
C0 , then it would like to devote it solely to consumption, and none to education.  Note
there is no preference for leisure
3.
(ii)  Technology
If r is invested in the education of a child whose parent is of type h then the
child’s future human capital will be
′ = h hr
bc α (3.2)
where α,, bc are positive constants.  We assume that
A1. 01 <+< bc .
b is the elasticity of child’s human capital w.r.t. parental human capital and c is
the elasticity of child’s human capital w.r.t. educational investment. The influence of the
parent’s human capital on the child’s human capital we think of as operating through
family culture, or perhaps neighborhood effects (if neighborhoods are income-segregated).
Later on, we will insert a stochastic term into (3.2), but for the present, note that the
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human capital determination process is deterministic.  Bénabou (in press) uses a
relationship like (3.2), and notes that, according to the empirical literature, assumption A1
holds.
If an adult of type h works at her full potential then her (pre-tax) earnings are h.
Thus human capital is measured in units of income-earning capacity.
(iii)  The policy space
Let C be the space of continuous functions on the domain R+.  A policy is a pair




∫ +≤ ( ( )) ( )) ( ) ψµ hr h d h F (3.3)
and two social norms hold, as described below.  The interpretation is that ψ() h  is the
after-tax income of an adult of type h, and rh () is the public educational investment in a
child from an h-family.
All educational investment is public.  Specification of a policy (, ) ψ r solves the
four political problems described in Section 1.
Thus the indirect utility function vT H : ×→ R is given by
vr h hC h r h
hC h c r h
hC c r h
bc
b
( , , ) log( ( ) ) log ( )
log( ( ) ) log log ( )











where, in the last line of (3.4), we have dropped a gratuitous constant term.
The two social norms are:
for all hh r h a
hr hm b
,( ) ( ) , ( . )
() () , (. )
′ + ′ ≥





where ‘prime’ indicates derivative, and the inequalities are meant to hold where the
derivatives exist.  m is a positive constant, a parameter of the problem.   We call
ψ() () hr h + the total resource bundle allocated to an h household, so (3.5ab) restrict the
rates at which the total resource bundle changes with h.   We call (3.5ab) social norms, as
they are not motivated by political competition or incentive compatibility considerations.
There is a natural incentive compatibility condition, that adult utility be non-
decreasing in h, so that no adult would have an incentive to work at a lower income-



















Some might prefer to substitute (3.5aa) for (3.5a) in the model, but doing so renders the
analysis below much more difficult.  (It converts what will be a convex optimization
problem on an infinite-dimensional space to a non-convex problem.)  In the interests of
simplicity, and not diffusing attention from our main concern, we use (3.5a) in lieu of
(3.5aa).  We conjecture, however, that the results we report would remain identical if
(3.5a) were replaced with (3.5aa).
Thus, our policy space is
Tr C =∈ {} (, ) ψ
2  (3.3), (3.5a), and (3.5b) hold .
B.  Quasi-PUNEs
For a given point (, )
* hy∈× + RR , consider the following two programs:17
max log( ( ) ) log ( )) ( )
() () (. )
( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( . )
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() () (. )
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* hy  be such that solutions (, ) ψ
LL r  and (, ) ψ
RR r  exist to (3.6) and (3.7),
respectively, and such that inequalities (3.63) and (3.73) bind at the solutions.  We will
show that the following hold:
10
2
.( , , ) ( , , ) ,




≤≤ ∞ ⇒ ≥
hh v r h v r h






It will follow that (, ) (, ) ψψ
LL RR rr  and   constitute a quasi-PUNE at (, )
* hy , and
that solutions of programs (3.6) and (3.7) at which (3.63) and (3.73) bind comprise
precisely the quasi-PUNEs for our problem.
Our first task is to characterize the set
Γ= ∈ × + {( , ) |
* hy RR solutions to (3.6) and (3.7) exist at which (3.63) and (3.73) bind}.
Note that Tr C =∈ {} (, ) ψ
2  (3.61) and (3.62) hold .  Consider the following three
programs:18
max ( , ; ) ( )
(, )
*













max ( , ; ) ( )
(, )























Let their solutions be denoted ττ τ
LR , , and 
*, respectively.  Let  yh
** ()  be the value of
program (3.10), i.e.
yh v h
** ** () (,) =τ ,
and define
yh v h yh v h
LL RR () (,) , () (,) .
** ** == ττ
We have:
Proposition 2.  For h
*given, (, )
* hy∈Γ iff
max[ ( ), ( )] ( ).
** * * yhyh y yh
LR ≤≤           (3.11)
Proof:
1. Suppose  yy h >
** () .  Then there is no feasible solution to (3.6) or (3.7), for (3.63)
will never hold on T.  Thus we must have  yy h ≤
** ()  if (, )
* hy∈Γ.
2. Suppose  yy h
L < ()
* .  Then constraint (3.63) is not binding at the solution to




, then constraint (3.73) is not binding at the solution to (3.7).  Thus
(, )
* hy∈Γ implies  yy h y h
LR ≥ max[( ( ), ( )].
**19
3. Conversely, if (3.11) holds, then the opportunity sets of (3.6) and (3.7) are non-
empty, and at the optimal solutions, (3.63) and (3.73) must bind, because
yy h y h
LR ≥ max[ ( ), ( )]
** .      
Actually, the proof of Proposition 2 has ignored the compactness issue - whether
non-emptiness of the opportunity sets for programs (3.6) and (3.7) implies the
attainment of (optimal) solutions.  We shall show below that if (3.11) holds, solutions are
indeed attained.
Thus we have argued that
Γ= ≤ ≤ {} ( , )max[ ( ), ( )] ( )
** * * * hy yh y h y yh
LR .
The virtue of the quasi-PUNE notion is now evident: we can characterize the set
Γ, and thus the set of quasi-PUNEs, merely by solving the three programs (3.8), (3.9),
and (3.10).  No fixed-point machinery is needed to do this.
We next solve these three programs.


















, if           (3.12a)
0, if                         (3.12b)
.20
Lemma 1. Let  XC ≥ 0 be the total resource dedicated to household h.  Then the


























If X<C0 then the optimal allocation is
ψ= = Xr ,. 0
Proof:  The household  would choose consumption ψ to maximize
its utility, which leads immediately to the claim.     
Proof of Proposition 3:
Let ( ˆ,ˆ) ψ r  be a solution to program (3.6), and suppose that the claim were false.  Define
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  if 21
It is straightforward to check that (, ) . ψ rT ∈  Furthermore, each household receives the
same total resource at ( ˆ,ˆ) ψ r  and at (, ) ψ r .  But according to Lemma 1, for every h,
( ( ), ( )) ψ hr h is the optimal way for household h to allocate the total resource assigned to
it between consumption and education.  Therefore the objective function of (3.6)
increases if we substitute  (, ) ψ r  for ( ˆ,ˆ) ψ r , a contradiction.   (To be precise, the argument
shows that  ( ˆ,ˆ) ψ r  must equal (, ) ψ r  except possible on a set of F-measure zero.
Continuity then completes the argument.)     
Remark 4. If we replaced social norm (3.5a) with incentive compatibility (3.5aa),
Proposition 3, although probably true, is much more difficult to prove.  It is for this
reason that we employ (3.5a).
Now suppose that the solutions to (3.8), (3.9), and (3.10) all give at least C0 in
total resource to every household.  Then we know, for each of those solutions, that
(3.12a) holds.  By substituting from (3.12a), we can reduce (3.8), (3.9), and (3.10) to the
following three programs:






























(h)d (h) k1 0
(3.8a)22

















































































Conversely, if the solutions to (3.8a), (3.9a), and (3.10a) all satisfy ψ() hC h >> 0 0  for  ,










0  and  .
We have:
Proposition 4. If A2 holds, then:
a.  The solution to  (3.8a) is23
ψ
h
L hk * () ; ≡ 1
in particular, we have ψh
L hC *() . > 0











































*is the solution of the equation
ψ02 0 21 1
** *
*




* ≥ C  , as  pictured in figure 1.




h and ** * ,, are all greater than C0 for h>0.
Proof:   See appendix.
Although we offer a formal proof of Proposition 4 in the appendix, the following
intuitive argument will probably convince the reader of the proposition’s validity.24
First, consider program (3.8a).  The benefit to household h is log( ( ) ) ψ hC − 0 ; the
cost  (to the optimizer) of supplying household h is ψ() h ; hence the benefit-cost ratio,






− 0 , is non-increasing in h, because  ′ ≥ ψ () h 0 is required.   So the optimizer
should give as much of the resource as possible to low h: front-loading, so to speak.  The
binding constraint is  ′ ≥ ψ () h 0: so the planner allocates ψ() . hk ≡ 1
Second, consider program (3.9a).  The planner wants to minimize the resource
going to [0,h*).  So, whatever the optimal value of ψ at h*, ψ should descend to the left of
h* as fast as possible – that is, at rate k2, to h=0.  to the right of h*, ψ should ascend as






means that the function ψh
R
* has exactly these properties – indeed, ψh
R
* never reaches the




R kh h k +=
∞
































0 , then ψ00
R C > .25
Third, consider (3.10a).  Clearly it is a waste to give any resource to hh > *, so we
must have
ψψ () (* ) * . hhh h =>  for 
Now the optimizer wants to minimize what goes to [0,h*), conditional upon reaching a
high value at h*, so ψ should descend rapidly (at rate k2) to the left of h*.   Thus the
stated function ψh* will be the solution as long as ψ00
* . ≥ C  Equation (3.13) is the budget
constraint, and the constraint on m implies that ψ00
* . ≥ C   This is obvious because it is
obvious that ψψ 0
** > R, because ψh
R
* gives more resource to [* , ) h ∞  than ψh*does.
In like manner, if A2 holds, then, using Proposition 3, we can reduce programs
(3.6) and (3.7) to:
max log( ( ) ) ( )
()
() ()








































max log( ( ) ) ( )
()
() ()
















































Of course, the analogous result to Proposition 2 holds, that is:
Proposition 2a.  Let  ˆ {( , )
* Γ= ∈ × + hy RR (3.6a) and (3.7a) have solutions at which
(3.63a) and (3.73a) bind}.  Define
ˆ ( ) log( ( ) )
ˆ ( ) log( ( ) )



























max[ $ () , $ () ]$$ ()
** * * yhyh yy h
LR ≤≤ . (3.14a)
Conversely, if (3.14a) holds, then (, ˆ) ˆ * hy∈Γ.
Proof:  As in Proposition 2.
ˆ Γ is our parameterization of the set of quasi-PUNEs associated with the
‘reduced’ problem, where we have substituted out for r.  From consideration of the three27
programs (3.8), (3.9), and (3.10), it is clear that the interval of admissible values  ˆ y is non-
empty for every h*.
We next derive what the quasi-PUNE looks like at (, ˆ) ˆ * hy∈Γ.
Proposition 5. Suppose A2 holds. Let (, ˆ) ˆ.
* hy∈Γ   Then:

































where ( ˆ ,) ψ0
L
L h  is the simultaneous solution of the two equations:
log( ˆ () ) ˆ,
* ψ02 0
L
L kh h C y +− − =          (3.15a)
ˆ () ( ) ( ( ) ) ( * ) .
*




L kh h d h F h k h h k
L
+− + − − = ∫ F (3.15b)
In particular,  ˆ ψ00
L C ≥ .
























where ( ˆ ,) ψ0
R
R h is the simultaneous solution of:
log( ˆ ) ˆ,
* ψ02 0
R kh C y +− = (3.15c)28
ˆ ( ) ( ( )) . ψ02 0 21 1
R h
RR kh d h F h k h k
R
++ − = ∫ F (3.15d)
In particular, ψ00
R C ≥ .
Proof.  See appendix.
Again, we provide an intuitive argument for Proposition 5.  First, consider
program (3.6a); we argue that ψ
L is the solution.  We know that ψ
Ly hC e (* )
ˆ −= 0  ,
because constraint (3.63a) binds at a quasi-PUNE.  Obviously, we must have
ψ
Ly hCe ()
ˆ =+ 0  for h>ˆh*  because it is a waste to give resources to [h*, ∞).  Now on [0,
h*), the optimizer wants to pile on the resource as early as possible. She does so up to
some value hL , at which ψ scoots up as rapidly as possible to its value at h*.  Equation
(3.15a) defines the value ψ
L h (* )  and equation (3.15b) is the budget constraint.
The reader can provide the reasoning for part b.
Finally, we must verify that  ˆˆ ψψ 00
LR  and   are both at least C0 .  From figures 2 and
3, it suffices to show that  ˆ ψ00
R C ≥ .  But it is clear, from consideration of programs (3.7a)
and (3.9), that  ˆ ψψ 00
RR ≥ , since the additional constraint (3.73a) in (3.7a) only forces the
constant term to be larger.  Therefore the claim follows.
Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 completely characterize the manifold of quasi-
PUNEs.29
A quasi-PUNE at (, )
* hy∈Γ is derived from a point (, ˆ) ˆ * hy∈Γ by defining
yc y c c =+ + () ˆ log 1 γγ γ ; the associated quasi-PUNE is given by
(, ( ) ) (, ( ) ) ψγψ ψγψ
LL RR cC cC −− 00  and   where ψψ
LR  and   are the solutions of (3.6a)
and(3.7a).  We have one thing left to check: that every member of each party at least
weakly favors her party’s policy to the other party’s policy.  This claim is easy to
verify.  Indeed, by superimposing figure 3 upon figure 2 we have figure 4; we see that the
after-tax income functions of the two parties coincide on the interval [,]
* hh L  of types,
and indeed, each member of a party weakly favors her party’s policy to the other’s.  Of
course, the two educational investment functions are just scaled down multiples of
translations of the functions graphed in Figure 4.  We illustrate them in Figure 5 for future
reference.
The key fact needed in the analysis to follow is that if A2 holds, then at any
quasi-PUNE, and therefore at any PUNEEP (, ) ψ r :
hh C r h >⇒ > ⇒ > 00 0 ψ() () .
C. PUNEEP
We know every PUNEEP is a quasi-PUNE.  We now show that the set of
PUNEEPs is non-empty.  To do so, we compute the PUNEEP where the militants of
each party get to play their ideal policies.30
Let h
* , =µ and let Lh R h == ∞ [, ) [ , ) .
** 0  and      Then the ideal policies of the






hk h k k h
()





The unique indifferent voter is
hh == µ
*.
 In particular, hh <
* implies h prefers ψψ ψψ
LR L hh  to   and   prefers   to 
R >
* .  The
militants in each party will assent to no deviation in policy. Thus (,, )
* ψψ
LR h  is a
PUNEEP.
Hence the set of PUNEEP is non-empty.  Indeed, other considerations
lead us to believe that there is a 2-manifold of PUNEEP, but that need not occupy us
here.
§4 Democratic dynamics
We now imagine a sequence of overlapping generations, at dates t = 01 , ,....  The
probability distribution of adult wages at date 0 is F
0.  Political competition is organized
over the questions of taxation and educational investment, and a PUNEEP is realized,
inducing a policy lottery.  One party wins the election, and its educational investment
policy is implemented, giving rise to a distribution of wages at date 1
1 ,F .  This process31
continues forever, inducing a sequence {} F
t of wage distributions.  We are interested in
the asymptotic distribution of wages.
Over time, it is not reasonable to suppose that Cm 0, , and α remain constant.  We
therefore denote their values at date t by Cm
tt t
0, , and α .  Let µ
t be the average human












0  and  .
The consequence of A2
t is that, at every PUNEEP (, ) ψ
tt r  at date t, rh
t() > 0 for h>0.







dh =− ∫() ( ) 1
2 F . (4.1)
We are, in particular, interested in the limit of {} η
t .  Does it exist, and if so, is it positive
or zero?
We will work with an altered sequence of distributions, normalized to maintain the
mean constantly at µ
0.  Define the distribution function







and let  ˆ F
t be the associated probability measure.  Then the mean of  ˆ F
t is µ
0.  Since  ˆ F
t
has the same coefficient of variation as F
t, we will study the coefficients of variation of
the sequence {ˆ } F
t .
Proposition  6.  If A1 and A2 hold, then the distribution function  ˆ F
t+1cuts the distribution
function  ˆ F
t once from below.  That is,32
() ( ˆ () ˆ () ˆ () ˆ ( )). ∃ ′ << ′ ⇒< > ′ ⇒>
++ h h hF h F h h hF h F h
tt tt 0
11  and 
Proof.
Let (, ) ψ r  be the PUNEEP at date t.  Since the mapping hh r h
tb c →α () is strictly
monotone increasing, mothers and sons occupy the same ranks in their respective wage
distributions, that is:
∀=
+ hF h r h F h




















Let θ:RR ++ →  be defined by:
∀∈ → +
+










Then we may rewrite (4.4) as  ˆ () ˆ (( ) ) FhF h
tt +− =











1() hh  as hh
>




































 is strictly increasing on R+, taking
on values from zero to “infinity,” which means that
( ) () () )
** ∃ ′ ≤<′ ⇒< > ′ ⇒> hh h h h h h 0 ζα ζα  and  .
 This will prove the proposition.
Suppose Left won the election at date t.  The graph of rh () is pictured in Figure 5
(recall rh c h C ( ) ( ( ) )). =− γψ 0   Obviously ζ() h  is strictly increasing on the intervals
[, ) , ) , 0 hh L  and [
* ∞  where r is constant.  On the interval [,]
* hh L , we have33
r h ck h () , =+ βγ 02  where β0 0 ≥ . (See figure 4: β0 0 ≥ because ψ00 0






















































Since β0 0 ≥ , the r.h.s. of the last inequality is no larger than unity, and hence ζ() h  is
strictly increasing on [,]







.  But this last inequality is guaranteed by A1.
Now suppose that Right won the election at date t.  Again consult figure 5.
Exactly, the same kind of argument shows that ζ is strictly increasing.   
Since the sequence  ˆ F
t {}  is mean-preserving and  ˆ F
t+1 cuts  ˆ F
tonce from below, we
have that  ˆ F
t+1 second-order stochastic dominates  ˆ . F
t   In particular, we know
∀> <





ˆ () ˆ () . (4.6)
Proposition 7.  The sequence  ˆ F





xF h d h () ˆ () =∫0 .  From (4.6), Φ
t x () is strictly decreasing in t, for any
x > 0.   Therefore, lim ( )
t
t x
→∞Φ  exists:  call the limit Φ() x .  We claim  ˆ F
t converges weakly
to  ′ Φ () x  (denoted  ˆ () ) Fx
t ⇒ ′ Φ .  We know Φ() x  is an increasing function, so its
derivative exists almost everywhere.
Because Φ
tt xF x ′ = () ˆ () , it suffices to show that
∀> ′ = ′ xx x
t


































tt xx x x ΦΦ Φ Φ
(4.8)
and the limits on the l.h.s. of (4.8) commute; we are done. 
Lemma 2. Let A2 hold. Let rr
LR ()  be the investment function of the Left (Right) at any
quasi-PUNE.  Let  ys h =+ β  be the line containing any chord of the graph of rr
LR () .
Then s and β are non-negative.
Proof.  Inspect Figure 5. 


















Theorem 1.  If A1 and A2, then  ˆ . FE =35
Proof:
We have observed that each ‘dynasty’ occupies a fixed rank in the mean-
normalized distributions  ˆ F
t, across time, regardless of which parties win the various
elections.
To prove the claim, it suffices to show that for any εδ ,( , ) , ∈ 01
(t  
* ∃> ⇒ − )(
* tt 1 ε of the mass of  ˆ F
t lies on an interval of length at most δ).


















































where  ys h
tt =+ β  is the equation of the chord containing rh rh
Jt Jt () () 11  and   (for
JLR =  or  ) in the realized PUNEEP at date t.
But since β














































































+ → .  In particular, for any small positive number
ηthere exists t




t >⇒ < +
* 2
1
1 η; since ranks of dynasties are preserved
across time, this means that fraction 1−ε of the mass of the distributions  ˆ F
t lies between
the mean-normalized variants of hh
tt
12  and  .
Denote these mean-normalized variants by  ˆˆ hh
tt
12  and  .  We claim {ˆ } h
t
1  are bounded
above by some number  M.  For suppose this were false and that for any  M > 0, we
eventually have  ˆˆ . hM hM
tt










ˆ () ( ) ( ) ,
ˆ
ˆ
F where  ′ M is some number in the
interval [ ˆ , ˆ ] hh
tt
12 , a contradiction.
Now let  Mh
t
t = sup 1.  Then the length of the interval [ ˆ ,( )ˆ ] hh
tt
11 1+η , which is ηˆ h
t
1




, we therefore show that 1−ε of the mass of  ˆ F
t
lies on an interval of length at most δ. 
Finally let us contrast the dynamics of democracy with the dynamics of laissez-
faire, a system in which there is no taxation.  In this case, each household partitions its
income, h, optimally between consumption and educational investment.




















If A1 holds, then the coefficient of variation of the distribution of human capital
approaches zero.  Democracy will speed up the convergence, but convergence to equality
will occur, absent democracy.
If C0 >0, then r h Max
c
c





0 0 .  We examine the special case in
which, for all t, CC
tt
00 ==  and αα .  We compute that the son’s human capital is greater




















The function on the r.h.s. of (4.10) approaches infinity asymptotically near C0 and as h
approaches infinity, as we illustrate in Figure 6.  As long as α is sufficiently large, there
will be two values, denoted hh 12  and  , where (4.10) is an equality.  The dynamics are
illustrated in Figure 6.   Fraction 1
0
1 − F () h  of the population end up eventually with zero
human capital, and the rest end up with human capital h2.  Thus, without democracy, we
have, asymptotically, a highly polarized society.
§5  Topping Off
We have assumed until now that educational funding is purely public.  But
winning publicly financed education has been itself a significant victory of democracy.  So
it would have been more realistic to begin with the supposition that education could be
privately or publicly financed.38
First, note that at any PUNEEP, under our assumptions, no household will desire
to top off public education with additional private education, because every PUNEEP
partitions the household’s total resource bundle just as the optimizing household would.
So there will be no demand for further private education at these equilibria.
Now suppose that it is not assumed, initially, that education will be publicly
financed.  Thus, a party may propose a policy (, ) ψ r  assuming that citizens will top off
privately, if rc C <− γψ () 0 .  Thus, the h-household facing the policy ( ( ), ( )) ψ hr h solves
for its private educational investment, which we denote r
P (h):
Max h r C c r h r
r
PP














































Without loss of generality, we may therefore write the household’s indirect utility
function as
vr h z hC ( , ; ) log( ( ) ). ψ= − 0
So we may write the program of the Left party (for instance) at h* as:39
Max z h C h







log( ( ) ) ( )
.. ( )
() ()


















It is thus clear that the set of PUNEEPs where private financing of education is not
precluded is isomorphic to the set of PUNEEPs where only public financing is possible.
It is a matter of indifference whether education is publicly funded or whether households
finance some or all education privately: the children receive identical educational
investments in both cases.  The key to convergence to wage equality is that A1 and A2
hold.
§6 Random talent
In this section, we alter the determination of the child’s future wage to admit a
random factor:  we assume that, if h is the wage of the mother and  ′ h  the wage of the
son, then
′ = h hr
b c εα (6.1)
where ε is a random variable. We shall assume that ε is lognormally distributed with a
mean of unity; thus logεis normally distributed with mean 
−σ
2
 and variance σ
2.
If we assume that a parent knows her child’s ‘talent,’ ε, before the election
occurs, then the politics are identical to what we have analyzed already:  ε enters simply
as a positive constant on the child’s wage, which does not affect any parent’s preferences40
over policies.  Thus our analysis of PUNEEPs stands.  The limit distribution of wages,
however, will change.
Let hh 21 > be two wages at date 0.  It is of interest to calculate the probability that
hh
tt
21 < , that is, the probability that the ranks of the t
thdescendants will have reversed.












































































i is the talent realization of the τ
th descendant of hi i,, .  for  =12  Taking
logarithms:




































 as the random variable R
t.  Define Z
tto be the random variable
















where  XX 12   and 









.  Then (6.2)
implies that
Pr[ ] Pr[ ( ) log ] Rm Zmb c
tt t ≤≥ ≤ − + ρ (6.3)
and so, in particular,41
Pr[ ] Pr[ ( ) log ] RZ b c
tt t ≤≥ ≤ −+ 0 ρ .
Now  Z



























= ∑ .  So for large t
t ,Ζ  is approximately
normally distributed with mean zero and variance 21
22 2 σσ (( ) ) −+ ≡ ∞ bc .
If, following Bénabou (in press), we take σσ =+ = = ∞ 1 0 7 1 980  and   then  bc ., .
* .








≤ , for large t, is at least
(approximately) the probability that N(, ) 0 σ∞  is less than logq.  For the values of
σ and ( ) b+c  given above, we compute these probabilities for various values of q:
q 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20




We have shown, that under assumptions A1 and A2, democracy leads
asymptotically to equalization of wages, in the precise sense that the coefficient of
variation of the distribution of human capital approaches zero.  A1 is an assumption
about the educational technology, which we assumed to hold timelessly.  A2 comprises
two assumptions; first, that µ
tt C > 0, which says that the society is sufficiently
developed that a family enjoying the mean income would rather send its child to school






0 , which says that it is politically
unacceptable for a political party to propose a policy where the total resource bundle42
(that is, after-tax income plus educational investment in the child) rises at too rapid a rate.
We might suppose that µ
t increases considerably more rapidly than C
t
0 with time, and so
eventually the constraint simply says that  m
t <1.   Now a society withm
t >1 would
seem to be quite regressive, and so the ‘social norm’ embodied in A2 will eventually be
quite mild.   So we can loosely summarize our analysis as saying that, once a democracy
reaches a sufficiently high level of economic development, convergence to equality of
human capital is assured.
We reiterate that we have demonstrated this result with essentially no other
restrictions on the policy space than the two social norms.  In this sense, the political
competition is quite unrestricted.
Why have we not observed more rapid convergence to equality of wages in
advanced democracies, then?   Three answers can be suggested.  First, there is a random
talent or effort element, as discussed in section 6, in wage determination.  Our analysis
says that, with such a stochastic element, we will not reach equality of wages, but rather a
situation in which the wages of distant descendents of the first ancestors are independent
of the wages of those ancestors.  Second, there are technological shocks that change the
distribution of human capital.  The worsening inequality of incomes in the US and UK in
the past twenty years is to be understood as a change in the wage-earning capacities of
individuals due to non-neutral technological change or increased competition.  Our model
has assumed these kinds of shock away.  We assumed only neutral technical change in
allowing the technological parameter α  to vary with time.  Third, democracy is not very43
old, and assumption A2  perhaps only holds in a small number of countries, and perhaps
only recently.  Without income taxation, which is to say under laissez-faire, we have that
the rate of increase of the total resource bundle with respect to h is unity, and A2 tells us
we can only expect convergence to equality, in this case, if C0 0 = .    Surely, A2 has held,
if indeed it does hold now, in most advanced democracies, for less than a century.
In the United States, funding for public education of h-households does increase
with h:  this is accomplished through the linking of educational finance with the local
property tax base.  In the political equilibria of our model, this is the case—that is, r(h) is
non-decreasing in h, and increasing in h in a region.  In many European countries, equal
public educational investment in children of all backgrounds is closer to the truth. Of
course, section 5 tells us that, in these equilibria, parents will top off the public
investment in their children.  I conjecture that, at least in the Nordic countries, this does
not occur.   We may understand this as the consequence of the operation of another social
norm – not one we have modeled here.  There is, however, an alternative explanation, that
the educational of other people’s children is a public good.   Whatever it is that forces the
investment of education in children not to increase with the human capital of the parents
will, of course, lead more rapidly to convergence to equality, given A1.
Theorem 1 has an implication for contemporary debates in democratic theory.
Democratic theorists are divided into two groups, according to whether they define
democracy in a minimalist or maximalist fashion.  The minimalist view (see, for example,
Przeworski et al (2000)) is that democracy is best conceived as a system with political
competition between parties, tout court.  The maximalist version frequently goes by the44
name of deliberative democracy (see, for instance, Elster (1998)); here democracy requires
as well as political competition, a thorough-going discussion among citizens – a forum – at
which citizens convince each other to take account of their mutual needs.   Maximalists
tend to think that political competition alone will not suffice to bring about a decent
society (read: equality or justice).
Our analysis tends to support this conclusion, in the sense that we have no









Of course, we have not shown that if this constraint fails, then democracy will not bring
convergence to equality.  All our analysis permits us to say is that, if it fails, then there
are quasi-PUNEs at which a positive mass of children will receive zero educational
investment.   (Perhaps, that is to say, a more delicate analysis could lead us to eliminate
any PUNEEPs that invest zero in a positive mass of children.)   Thus, at this point, it is
attractive to say that the deliberative aspect of democracy induces a social norm that
assures that the required constraint on the rate of increase of total resources holds.45
Appendix:  Proof of Propositions 3 and 5
The proof of all the parts of these propositions is the same.  I will prove only
Proposition 5 part a, as an illustration of the technique.
Let ψ
L be the function defined in Prop.5, part a.  We know that the optimal
solution must coincide with ψ
L on [* , ) h ∞ ; the only issue is to prove that ψ
L is indeed
the solution on [0,h*).
Suppose  ψ
L were not optimal.  Let ψ
L+g be the true solution, where g is a
variation defined on [0,h*].  We must have gh (* ) = 0 because we know ψ
L takes the right
value at h*.
Proposition B1. Suppose ψ
L+g is in T and gh (* ) = 0.  Suppose there exists a non-
negative function λ:[ , *] hh L → + R  and a number δ>0 such that the function
∆( ): log( ( ) ( ) ) ( ) ( )( ( ( ) ( )) )
( ( () () ) )
**
*
εψ ε λψ ε
δψ ε










hg h C h h k hg hh













() () . dF   Then the value of program (3.6a) at ψ
L
is at least as great as its value at ψ
L+g.
Proof:46





kh h K ′ == ∫ 2 0  on   and  d [ , *] .
*





0 0 ∫ − dF which
is the value of program (3.6a) at ψ
L.
2.  Feasibility of ψ
L g +  implies that
(( ) ( ) ) [ , * ] ψ
L
L hg h k h h + ′ ≤ 2 on 





0 ∫ +≤ dF
Therefore at ε=1, the second and third terms in expression ∆(1) are non-negative, because
of the non-negativity of λ and δ.
3.  But  ∆∆ () () . 01 ≥   It follows that
log( ) log( )
**
ψψ
L h L h
Cg C
0 0 0 0 ∫∫ −≥ + − dd FF .          


































on [, * ] hh L , where f is the density function of F.  Then δλ ≥≥ 00 , ( ) [ , *], h on h h and L Λ is
maximized at ε=0.
Of course, Propositions B1 and B2 together prove that ψ
L is the solution of
program (3.6a).
Proof of Prop. B2:
1.  We have shown in the text that δ≥0.47
2.  Because ψψ
LL




















on the interval.  Since λ() hL = 0 by definition, it follows that λ≥0 on [ , *]. hh L
3.  Note that ∆  is a concave function.  Thus to show that ∆ is maximized at zero, it
suffices to show that zero is a local maximum of ∆.  We proceed to demonstrate this

















































































The key step in the above expansion is the use of integration by parts to integrate the
λ() () hg h ′ term.  Now, nothing that λ() ( * ) , hg h L == 00  and   and substituting for  ′ λ () h ,









































as was to be shown. 
Remark.  The reader who wishes to employ this technique to prove the other parts of
Propositions 3 and 5, should he or she not be convinced by the intuitive arguments
presented in the text,  should write down the Lagrangian function ∆(ε)  with the unknown48
parameters λ() ⋅  and δ and carry out the integration by parts.  It will be immediately clear
how λ and δ are to be defined.  Of course, the technique only works when one ‘knows’
the solution to the program.49
References
Bénabou, R. (in press)“Tax and Education Policy in a Heterogeneous Agent
Economy:  What Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth and Efficiency?”,
Econometrica
Elster, J. (ed.) 1998.  Deliberative Democracy, New York: Cambridge University
Press
Przeworski, A., M.E. Alvarez, J.A. Cheibub, and F. Limongi, 2000.  Democracy
and Development, New York:  Cambridge University Press
Roemer, J.E. 1998.  “Why the poor do not expropriate the rich: An old argument
in new garb,” Journal of Public Economics 70 (3) 399-424
-- 1999. “The democratic political economy of progressive taxation,”
Econometrica, 67, 1-19.
-- 2001. Political Competition: Theory and Applications, Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University PressFigure 1  The solution to program (3.10a)
eC







ψFigure 2  The solution to (3.6a)
hL
eC




































hFigure 6  Dynamics under laissez-faire when C0 > 0
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